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THE MISCONCEPTION OF "SEX" IN TITLE VII:
FEDERAL COURTS REEVALUATE TRANSSEXUAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine spending twenty-five years working for the Army only to be told that
because of your sexual identity, you are no longer good enough to work for the federal
government. I Imagine being told you are highly qualified for the position and have been
selected, 2 but you would not be a "good fit" 3 because you are transgender. This is the
story of Diane Schroer.
4
In 2004, after Diane Schroer retired from the Army, she was offered a job as a
terrorism research analyst with the Library of Congress. 5 However, when Diane (then
Dave) told the Library of Congress she was transitioning from male to female, they
withdrew the job offer.6 "I couldn't understand how the country that I had risked my life
for could believe that it was ok to rescind its job offer to me solely because I'm
transgender." 7  In Schroer v. Billington,8 Schroer filed suit against the Library of
Congress asserting the refusal to hire her was sex discrimination protected by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
9
Schroer, however, faces an uphill battle. 10  While the Supreme Court has held
discrimination because of [biological] sex and discrimination on the basis of gender,
called sex stereotyping, are prohibited by Title VII," 1 transgender people currently enjoy
1. See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter Schroer f]. "Plaintiff Diane
Schroer, a male-to-female transsexual, sues defendant Library of Congress for sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)." Id. at 205. "Schroer is a twenty-five
year veteran of the U.S. Armed Services." Id.
2. "[Schroer] was highly qualified for the position." Id. "[The Library of Congress] called Schroer to
offer her the position." Id. at 206.
3. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 206. "'Given [Schroer's] circumstances' and 'for the good of the service,'
Schroer would not be a 'good fit' at [the Congressional Research Service, an arm of the Library of Congress]."
Id.
4. Id. at 205-06.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 206.
7. ACLU, Federal Court Rules Transgender Discrimination Lawsuit against Library of Congress Can
Proceed, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/transgender/2485 Iprs20060331 .html (Mar. 31, 2006) (The ACLU represents
Diane Schroer.).
8. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.
9. Id. at 205; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
10. Kenneth Jost, Transgender Issues: The Issues, 16 CQ Researcher 385, 387 (May 5, 2006) (available at
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2006050500).
11. See Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(indicating "Title VII reaches claims of discrimination based on 'sex stereotyping."')); see e.g. Ulane v. E.
1
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no explicit protection under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Only thirteen states and the
District of Columbia have explicit laws protecting transsexuals from discrimination.
13
What is unclear is whether the idea that sex is not always fixed and that sex can be a
"human-made process" is protected by Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.
14
Nearly two decades have passed since the Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,15 held that the phrase "because of... sex" in Title VII protects an individual
from sex stereotyping discrimination based on a person's gender nonconformity. 16 The
Price Waterhouse Court, while discussing the legislative history behind Title VII, said
that Congress did not intend "sex" to be limited to discrimination based on biological
sex. 17  Rather, in enacting Title VII, Congress also intended to forbid gender
discrimination. 18  However, many courts continue to incorrectly reject transsexuals'
claims of employment discrimination under Title VII. 19 Based on the lack of uniformity
in court decisions following Price Waterhouse, it is clear that applying Title Vii's
"because of ... sex" wording "in the context of transsexuals is decidedly complex."
20
Throughout history, society has constructed norms for gender-appropriate
behavior; including rules for appropriate behavior, dress, and sexual expression.
2 1
Gender norms assume individuals are born either as a man or as a woman and should
behave accordingly.22  These rigid gender rules are often very harmful to everyone in
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (indicating that "Title VII prohibit[s] discrimination based
on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women
and against men because they are men.").
12. Kristine W. Holt, Student Author, Reevaulating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the
Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 283, 285 (1997).
13. Transgender L. & Policy Inst., Non-Discrimination Laws that Include Gender Identity and Expression,
Maps & Charts, Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, http://transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (last
updated Sept. 2007) (the thirteen states are California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington). See also ABA Res. 122B at 4
(Aug. 7-8, 2006) (available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/
hundredtwentytwob.doc) (citing Transgender L. & Policy Inst., U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting
Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Expression, stating that ninety-three cities and counties
explicitly forbid discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression in housing, employment, and/or
accommodations).
14. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (quoting, as one of three issues, "does Title VII prohibit
discrimination against transsexuals?"). Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex
and Transsex Liberties, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 51, 53 (2006). "Less understood is the notion that sex itself is
not fixed, clear, or 'objective,' and that sex is also a human-made process." Id. See Holt, supra n. 12, at 285
(noting that the transgender community's "legal status is ... uncertain and precarious.").
15. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
16. Id. at 250-51.
17. Id. at 239-40.
18. Id.; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. The Supreme Court held that when Congress enacted Title VII, Congress
intended "because of... sex" to "forbid employers to take gender into account," and not just forbid
discrimination "against men because they are men and women because they are women." Id.
19. See Holt, supra n. 12, at 286 ("[L]ower courts have applied the outdated statutory interpretation of
narrowly defining 'sex' solely to derogate transgender persons' civil rights and equal protection guarantees
under Title VII."). See e.g. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 2005 WL 1505610 at *3 (D. Utah June 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Etsitty I], ajf'd, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Etsitty 11].
20. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Etsitty 1, 2005 WL 1505610 at
*3; Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Serv., 2001 WL 34350174 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001)).
21. Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 Berkeley Women's L.J. 15, 24 (2003)
(outlining how the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual discusses symptoms of Gender Identity Disorder,
including gender inappropriate behavior).
22. Id. at 32 (discussing that society sets out standard for how people should act within their gender
[Vol. 43:765
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society-regardless of sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity. 23 Most important to
this paper is the harm gender norns cause to transgender people who do not fit into one
of the two traditional gender categories. 24 Transgender people are often seen as "gender
deviants ' 25 and, as a result, experience extensive discrimination. 26 Transgender people
"are regularly denied employment, fired from their jobs, denied housing and public
accommodations at hotels and restaurants, even harassed, beaten or murdered because of
hatred of their gender noncomformity. ' 2 7  This mistreatment terrorizes transgender
peoples' "freedom to work and live safely in their own communities.
28
Transgender people frequently experience anxiety stemming from legal identity
issues, and "[a]mbiguity in gender presentation can bring ridicule and ostracism."
2 9
While every aspect of discrimination deserves attention, this paper focuses on
employment discrimination. Employment discrimination includes the "failure to hire or
promote, demotions, terminations, restrictions on a person's gender expression, and
hostile environments resulting from basic bias against people who transition from one
gender to another on the job or are known, or discovered, to have done so in the past."30
The discrimination of transgender people in the workplace is significant and
"widespread.,31 One study on transgender people in San Francisco found "[fifty percent
of the study's] respondents had experienced employment discrimination." 3 2 Because of
category).
23. Sean Cahill, Preface, in Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Transgender Equality: A Handbook for
Activists and Policymakers i, iii (Policy Inst. Natl. Gay & Lesbian Task Force 2000) (available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf). "Every person has a gender.
When the expression of those genders is caught in rigid social scripts, people get hurt." Id. The traditional
gender binary has shown to be a large obstacle for transsexuals bringing Title VII sex discrimination claims.
See Etsitty II, 502 F.3d at 1222 (stating that "[i]n light of the traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals
may not claim protection under Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual").
24. See Spade, supra n. 21, at 25-26 (discussing the problem with "the scripted transsexual childhood
narrative" in relation to medical treatment is that it often requires transsexuals to have corrective surgery to
"reestablish [stereotypical gender] norm[s]").
25. Id. at 25 (discussing medical views associated with gender identity disorder).
26. ABA Res. 122B at 4.
27. Cahill, supra n. 23, at iii.
28. GLAD, Rights and Resources, Transgender Issues, http://www.glad.org/rights/transgender.shtml (last
updated Mar. 4, 2008).
29. Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronormativity, 10 L. &
Sexuality 123, 147 (2001) (citing Riki Ann Wilchins, Read My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender
(Firebrand Bks. 1997). Society views a sense of "naturalness" to heterosexuality, and often society views
"anyone falling outside of [the norm] falls short of human." Id. at 132. "Because of this oppressive
heteronormativity, transsexual people usually choose to live 'under the radar,' seeking to limit or erase their
'transsexual' status, for two reasons." Id. First, transsexuals view themselves as males or females, not
transsexuals, and their transsexualism is kept a private matter. Id. (citing Suzanne Kessler & Wendy McKenna,
Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach 121 (U. Chicago Press 1985)). Second, disclosure can result in
"public shame, discrimination, harassment, and physical danger." Id. (citing Intl. Conf. Transgender L. &
Empl. Policy, Discrimination against Transgender People in America, 3 Natl. J. Sexual Orientation L. 1, 2
(1997)).
30. Natl. Ctr. Lesbian Rights & Transgender L. Ctr., Advancements in State and Federal Law Regarding
Transgender Employees: A Compliance Guide for Employers and Employment Law Attorneys,
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/complianceguideemployers.pdfdoclD= 1201 (last updated Apr. 2006).
See also GLAD, supra n. 28 (discussing how the most common harassment and discrimination transgender
people experience is in employment, housing, and public accommodations).
31. ABA Res. 122B at4.
32. Id. (citing Shannon Minter & Christopher Daley, Trans Realities: A Legal Needs Assessment of San
Francisco's Transgender Communities Introduction, http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/tranny/pdfs/
2008]
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the significant discrimination to transgender people, organizations and employers have
begun acknowledging the importance of protecting transsexuals from workplace
discrimination. 33  For example, 125 of the Fortune 500 companies have policies
prohibiting transgender discrimination.34  On August 8, 2006, the American Bar
Association House of Delegates passed resolution 122B, "which urges the protection of
transgender people in employment." 35 The ABA stated it "has an obligation to speak out
on behalf of transgender people, who currently face widespread, invidious discrimination
on the basis of their gender identity and expression."
36
While approximately thirty-seven percent of the United States population lives in a
state that has laws prohibiting transgender discrimination, there is currently no federal
protection for transgender people. 37  This article examines the possibility that
transsexuals can bring a successful sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 38 Part II of this paper defines the term transsexual, as well as
examines the terms which fall under the transgender umbrella. Part III examines the
background of Title VII in relation to transsexual sex discrimination cases. Part IV
shows how the courts that are currently rejecting transsexuals' Title VII sex
discrimination claims are misinterpreting the term "sex" 39 and are incorrectly viewing
congressional history.40 Part V analyzes "sex stereotyping" and shows that only in
certain circumstances does sex stereotyping afford transsexuals protection under Title
VII.41 Part VI examines a new approach that moves away from the typical sex
stereotyping analysis toward an analysis that says discrimination because of gender
Trans%20Realities%2OFinal%2OFinal.pdf (2003)).
33. SeeABARes. 122B.
34. Human Rights Campaign Found., The State of the Workplace for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and
Transgender Americans 2006-2007, http://www.hrc.org/documents/State of the Workplace.pdf (2007). See
also Transgender L. Inst., Employer and Union Polices: Employers Who have Policies Prohibiting
Discriminating Against Transgender People, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/employer/index.htm (last updated
Mar. 21, 2006) (providing a list of employers that prohibit gender identity or expression discrimination with
polices that the Transgender Law Policy has been able to confirm). Also, 115 colleges and one law school
prohibit gender identity discrimination. ABA Res. 122B at 5 (citing Transgender L. Inst., Colleges and
Universities, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/index.htm#policies (last updated Jan. 31, 2008)) (when
the ABA passed the resolution there were forty-seven colleges and universities, now there are 115, plus one
law school, that prohibit gender identity discrimination; the law school is Golden Gate University School of
Law).
35. Jon Geier et al., Recent Federal Rulings Shift Toward Title VII Protection of Transsexual Employees,
21 Andrews Empl. Litig. Rptr. 13 (2006) (citing ABA Resolution 112]2B). ABA Resolution 122B also "urges
the protection of transgender people in ... housing and public accommodations." Id.
36. Id.
37. Leslie A. Farber, A Primer to Transgender Legal Issues and Practice, 239 N.J. Law. 39, 40 (2006)
(these laws are "explicit anti-discrimination" laws protecting transgender people).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
39. Courts rejecting transsexuals' claims hold the phrase "because of... sex" refers to biological sex. See
Richard F. Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in Employment Discrimination, 55
Me. L. Rev. 117, 126-27 (2003) (describing how the most significant problem with transsexuals treatment in
employment law "is the great inconsistency between the legal and medical determination of sex").
40. Specifically, section III will show how these courts are ignoring case law that holds Title VII is not
limited to those types of discrimination Congress intended the phrase "because of... sex" to mean, and that
these cases are incorrectly viewing failed attempts to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation to mean
they are failed attempts to include gender identity to Title VII.
41. "Sex stereotyping" protects transsexuals when they are being discriminated against because of their
failure to act feminine or masculine enough for an employer, but does not protect against discrimination when a
transsexual is not going "against the gender grain, but with it." Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
[Vol. 43:765
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identity disorder is discrimination "because of... sex." The courts rejecting transsexual
sex discrimination claims are misinterpreting case law regarding gender identity because
the proper application of "sex" to Title VII extends protection to transsexuals on the
basis of "sex stereotyping" and "gender identity," as reflected in Smith v. City of Salem4 2
and Schroer, which this comment claims represent more accurate interpretations.
II. DEFINITIONS
In general, transgender 4 3 individuals are people whose birth sex does not match
their internal perception of their gender identity.44  When discussing the law, when
practicing the law, and when using everyday language, understanding the appropriate
terms to use in discussing transgender issues is important.45  While some argue that
using these terms may perpetuate sexist stereotypes, 46 defining them is necessary to
analyze particular laws because jurisdictions treat the terms differently.4 7 Therefore,
it is important to read the small print: not all of these laws protect everyone whose gender
identity and expression is at odds with prevailing social norms. The scope of any particular
law depends on the Jarticular definition that is used, and may be limited by exclusions
written into the law.
Also, the diversity in the transgender community can be confusing to an outsider.
4 9
To clarify this confusion, here are some definitions.
50
Often, the terms "gender" and "sex" are used synonymously. 5 1 However, "sex"
usually refers "to a person's biological ... identity as male or female." 52  The term
42. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the plaintiff successfully states a claim for sex discrimination
under Title VII).
43. There seem to be no accurate estimates of how many transgender people live in the United States. "The
number of transsexuals in the United States is uncertain and subject to dispute." Jost, supra n. 10, at 387.
Dean Spade, a transgender attorney and founder of the Sylvia Rivera Project, said "there are no current
estimates [I] would trust on the number of trans people [sic] in the U.S. [N]o one counts us so the numbers we
have are local and based on small studies." E-mail from Dean Spade to Amanda Eno (Sept. 9, 2006, 10:00
a.m. CDT).
44. Jamison Green, Introduction to Transgender Issues, in Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Transgender
Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers (Policy Inst. Natil. Gay & Lesbian Task Force 2000)
(available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf).
45. "The best way to get a fuller understanding of gender terms is to look at many different sources. When
dealing with an individual, it is important to ask what terms they prefer for themselves." Fair Workplace
Project, Gender Identity and Employment: Definitions of Terms 7 (Basic Rights Educ. Fund 2003) (available at
http://www.srlp.org/documents/FWPPacket 2003_gi-supplemental.pdf). "The diversity is really the key to
the liberating aspect of transgender identity and politics." Shannon Minter, The Transgender Umbrella: One
View, in Natil. Ctr. Lesbian Rights & Transgender L. Ctr., Advancements in State and Federal Law Regarding
Transgender Employees: A Compliance Guide for Employers and Employment Law Attorneys,
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/complianceguideemployers.pdf?doclD= 1201 (last updated Apr. 2006).
46. Green, supra n. 44, at 2 ("these differences may sometimes ... perpetuate invidious racist stereotypes
and practices").
47. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, A Growing Grassroots Movement for Trans Equality, in
Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers 18 (Policy Inst. Natil. Gay & Lesbian Task
Force 2000) (available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf).
48. Id.
49. Weiss, supra n. 29, at 142.
50. Id. ("There are many shades of gender variance, as well as considerable disagreement about the terms
used to describe them.").




Eno: The Misconception of Sex in Title VII: Federal Courts Reevaluate
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
TULSA LA W RE VIEW
"gender" refers to the "collection of characteristics that are culturally associated with
maleness or femaleness." 53  Traditionally, "sex" is seen as a permanent, 54 immutable
characteristic. 55 But, in the context of transsexuals, a disagreement exists on whether
"sex" should be considered a mutable characteristic. 56
"'Gender identity' refers to a person's internal, deeply felt sense of being either
male or female, or something other or in between." 5 7 Rather than being a characteristic
that others can perceive, gender identity is the way a person defines oneself.58  In
contrast, a person's "gender expression" is external and socially defined. 59  "Gender
expression" refers to all characteristics that are seen as "either masculine or feminine,
such as dress, mannerisms, speech patterns and social interactions."
60
"Transsexuals" are individuals whose gender identity (their internal perception)
does not match their biological sex. 6 1  For example, a transsexual who was born a
biological male internally perceives himself as having a female gender identity.
62
Despite the inclusion of "sex" in the word transsexual, sexual orientation is not the
defining characteristic. 63 No connection exists between a person's gender identity (an
internal sense of being male or female), gender expression (external characteristics), and
sexual orientation (what sex a person is attracted to). 64  Transsexualism "is not about
[boys] liking boys or [girls liking] girls; it is about being boys or girls, a qualitatively
different experience." 65 Transsexuals internally perceive themselves as a member of the
opposite sex, and thus are "not ... homosexual[s] in the traditional sense of the word. 66
Not all transgender people identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and not all gay, lesbian,
or bisexual people display gender non-conforming characteristics.
67
53. Id.
54. Ben-Asher, supra n. 14, at 52 (citing Judith Butler, Undoing Gender 40-43 (Routledge 2004))
("[W]hile 'sex' is often perceived as permanent, non-negotiable, and objective.").
55. "'[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident
of birth."' D. Douglas Cotton, Student Author, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines: Title VII and Transsexualism, 80
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1059 n. 176 (1986) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
However, Title VII is not limited to protecting immutable characteristics. "For example, title VII prohibits
discrimination based on religion, a voluntary, not immutable, characteristic." Id.
56. For additional information on "sex" being a mutual characteristic, like religion, review the text
accompanying infra notes 170-75.




61. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. 1999) (discussing how "transsexuals believe and feel they
are members of the opposite sex").
62. This is an example of a male-to-female transsexual (MTF). There are also female-to-male transsexuals
(FTM). See Green, supra n. 44, at 3.
63. Weiss, supra n. 29, at 130. "Sexual orientation refers to whether a person is attracted to men, women or
to both." Green, supra n. 44, at 8.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Weiss, supra n. 29, at 130.
66. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230. Also, transsexuals are not transvestites. Id. "Transsexuals do not believe
they are dressing in the opposite sex's clothes. They believe they are dressing in their own sex's clothes." Id.
See also Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 164 N.Y. Misc. 2d 547, 551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (stating that
transvestites are "not to be confused with transsexuals").
67. Green, supra n. 44, at 8. "[A] person's gender expression is often mistakenly assumed to reveal that
person's sexual orientation." Id. These stereotypes are "not only unreliable and untrue, they are dangerous."
Id. at 9. "Educating legislators and policymakers about the damage inflicted by sexism and gender
[Vol. 43:765
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Some transsexual individuals seek medical treatment to correct their physical
body.68 Transition is the process by which individuals go through hormone therapy and
sex reassignment to change themselves to align with their gender identity.69 There are
female-to-male transsexuals and male-to-female transsexuals. 7°  Technically,
transsexualism is a psychiatric disorder known as gender identity disorder (GID).7 1 The
diagnosis and treatment of transsexualism is listed in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic
72and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). Transgender advocates
disagree on whether GID should be listed in the DSM-IV because "[it] gives a misleading
picture of transgender people and their lives."73 Not all transsexual people have mental
health problems and, after transitioning, transsexuals live "normal, productive, healthy
lives." 74 Also, the latest studies suggest that being transgender is not a mental condition,
but it is a physical condition.75 "These studies may support the conclusion that being
transgender is just one variation in the broad range of human physical experiences. ' 76
"Transgender" refers to people who identify with the sex that is opposite of their
birth sex or who express their gender in ways atypical to their birth sex.7 7 Originally, the
term "transgender" had a limited meaning, only referring to a biological man who
wished to live as a woman.78 Today, the term "transgender" has become an umbrella
term.79 The term applies to a wide range of people who seem to display characteristics
stereotyping is a critical component of winning basic civil rights protections for GLBT people." Id.
68. Id. at 3. See also Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230 ("Through surgery and hormones, a transsexual male can
be made to look like a woman, including female genitalia and breasts.").
69. Fair Workplace Project, supra n. 45, at 7. "This may include a name change, pronoun change, and
hormonal and/or surgical modifications." Id. "Transition may, but does not always, include necessary medical
care like hormone therapy, counseling, and/or surgery." Minter, supra n. 45.
70. Green, supra n. 44, at 3. "Female-to-male transsexual (FTM) people are born with female bodies, but
have a predominantly male gender identity. Male-to-female transsexual (MTF) people are bom with male
bodies, but have a female gender identity." Id.
71. Farber, supra n. 37, at 39 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders IV (Am. Psychiatric Assn. 1994)) (GID is also known as gender dysphoria.). "However, there is
some controversy within the mental health community regarding whether gender identity disorder should be
listed in the DSM as a mental disorder." Id. at 42 n. 2. See also Neil Dishman, The Expanding Rights of
Transsexuals in the Workplace, 21 Lab. L. 121, 123 (2005) (citing e.g. Lie v. Sky Publg. Corp., 2002 WL
31492397 at **1-2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002)). "Strictly speaking, a 'transsexual' is a person who is (or
could be) diagnosed with a recognized medical condition known as Gender Identity Disorder (sometimes called
GID or 'gender dysphoria.')." Id.
72. Fair Workplace Project, supra n. 45, at 7.
73. See Jost, supra n. 10, at 390-91, 401 (discussing whether Gender Identity Disorder should be listed in
the DSM-JV).
74. Id. at 390. However, some transsexuals .'do have mental health problems, such as depression or
substance abuse... [b]ut... those are related to gender identity only because of how we're treated, not
because of gender identity itself."' Id.
75. Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People through Disability
Laws, in Transgender Rights 74, 81 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., U. Minnesota Press 2006) (discussing studies
that say being transgender is physiological, not psychological).
76. Id.
77. Farber, supra n. 37, at 39.
78. Green, supra n. 44, at 4. "Before the mid-1990's, the term 'transgender' had a narrower and more
specific meaning." Id. "[Tihe term originally referred to biological men who are satisfied with their male
genitalia, but who wish to be seen and to live in the world as women." Id.
79. Id. at 3.
[A]n "umbrella" term that is used to describe a wide range of identities and experiences, including
but not limited to: pre-operative, post-operative, and non-operative transsexual people; male and
2008]
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atypical to that of their birth sex. In most cases, "[t]ransgender... people do not
choose to be the way that they are; [instead,] they are acting on 'deep-seated and
irreversible feelings. ' 8 1  In addition, transgender people's sexual orientation is
"predominantly heterosexual (based on genitalia), but there are also bisexual, asexual,
and homosexual individuals." 82 While transgenderism is repeatedly amalgamated with
homosexuality, sexual orientation is not the characteristic that defines transgenderism.
83
Is it appropriate to use "transgender" as an umbrella term? Naming transgender
people as a distinct group may have negative consequences because "it reinforces the
mistaken view that transgender individuals are somehow fundamentally different than
other people." 84 Nevertheless, "[f]rom a political perspective, . . . it has been necessary
to embrace the label 'transgender' to foster a sense of solidarity among those who bear
the brunt of discrimination against gender atypical people." 85  Remember, "[o]nly by
naming that discrimination can we hope to end it, ... [and only then] can we create a
world in which the label 'transgender' will no longer be needed.",86  In general, this
paper uses "transgender" as an umbrella term. However, because the relevant case law
involves plaintiffs that have either transitioned or are in the process of transitioning,
87
this paper will focus on transsexuals.
female cross-dressers (sometimes referred to as "transvestites," "drag queens," or "drag kings');
intersexed individuals; and men and women, regardless of sexual orientation, whose appearance or
characteristics are perceived to be gender atypical.
Id. "As currently used, 'transgender' is an umbrella term that is analogous to other umbrella terms like people
of color or people with disabilities." Minter, supra n. 45.
80. Green, supra n. 44, at 3. Transgender is often used to include intersexed people. Intersexed people can
be bom with sexual anatomy that mixes male and female characteristics in ways that make it difficult to label
them male or female. Id. at 5. Intersexed people can be "born with a sexual anatomy that mixes male and
female characteristics in ways that make it difficult ... to label them male or female." Id. "Intersexed infants
may have ambiguous genitalia, such as a penis that is judged 'too small' or a clitoris that is judged 'too large."'
Id. Some intersexed people may have internal reproductive organs usually associated with the other sex than
the sex they were born. Id. Intersexed people sometimes have to have the same medical treatments as
transsexuals. Green, supra n. 44, at 6. In addition, "intersexed people are often discriminated against in
employment and other areas if their intersexed identity becomes known." Id. And, "[I]ike other transgendered
people, intersexed people have mostly been excluded from any legal protection under existing anti-
discrimination laws." Id. Intersexed people often face many of the same obstacles of transgender people (they
are stigmatized, face employment discrimination, and they are excluded from anti-discrimination laws). Id.
This paper will not include intersexed people in its treatment of Title VII law.
81. Farber, supra n. 37, at 39 (citing Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders IV-TR 581-82 (Am. Psychiatric Assn. 2000)).
82. Green, supra n. 44, at 4.
83. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226 (citing Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and
Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA Women's L.J. 219, 237 (1997)); see also Maffei, 164 N.Y. Misc. 2d at 551 ("A
transsexual is not homosexual in the true sense as the latter seek sexual gratification from members of their
own sex as members of that sex, whereas transsexuals' erotic attractions are generally with persons of their
own anatomic sex, but viewing themselves as members of the opposite desired sex.").
84. Green, supra n. 44, at 2.
Many transsexual people have been willing to take on the label of transgender because it describes
their experience before their change of sex, or in some way helps to describe their ongoing
consciousness once they have changed their sex, implying the broader social awareness they may
have as a result of experiencing life from within two kinds of (perceived) bodies, though their
gender identity may always have remained the same.
Id. at 4-5.
85. Id. at 2-3.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Dishman, supra n. 71, at 124.
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III. THE HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUAL CASE LAW ON TITLE VII
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "because
of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 88  While Title VII
seems to protect all people from sex discrimination, 89 the majority of federal courts deny
transsexuals' Title VII sex discrimination claims.90  Traditionally, federal courts deny
transsexuals' discrimination claims based on a narrow interpretation of congressional
intent behind the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII.9 1 These courts systematically held
Congress intended the word "sex" to mean biological sex, 92 not gender identity. 93 These
holdings follow a 1984 Seventh Circuit ruling, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc.,94 that held
"the total lack of legislative history ... clearly indicates that Congress never considered
nor intended that [Title VII] apply to anything other than the traditional concept of
sex."
95
In Ulane, Kenneth Ulane, who was born male, was hired as a pilot for Eastern
Airlines. 96 Eleven years after being hired, Ulane was diagnosed as a transsexual and
underwent hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery. 97 After the surgery, Ulane's
birth certificate was revised to say female, and the Federal Aviation Administration
revised Ulane's flight status to female. 98 When Eastern Airlines found out Ulane was a
transsexual, they fired her.99 Ulane then brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim
against Eastern Airlines. 10 0 The Ulane court held, "[t]he words of Title VII do not
outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity disorder."
10 1
The court noted its "responsibility" was to determine what Congress intended
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
89. Leena D. Phadke, Student Author, When Women Aren't Women and Men Aren't Men: The Problem of
Transgender Sex Discrimination under Title IX, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 837, 838 (2006) (citation omitted)
("Although Title VtI. .. purport[s] to protect all individuals from discrimination on the basis of sex...
transgender individuals do not necessarily enjoy such protection.").
90. See Dishman, supra n. 71, at 127 ("The first courts to consider the issue uniformly rejected
transsexuals' Title VII claims."). See e.g. Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081; Sommers v. Budget Mkg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748
(8th Cir. 1982); Underwood v. Archer Mgt. Servs., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994).
91. Dee McAree, Natil. L.J., Courts Still at Odds over Transsexuals' Civil Rights, http://
www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id= 1123578311575 (Aug. 10, 2005).
92. Phadke, supra n. 89, at 839 (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir.
1977)).
93. Id. at 838 (citing Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-
Discrimination Law, 75 Deny. U. L. Rev. 1321, 1353-54 (1998)).
94. 742 F.2d 1081.
95. Id. at 1085.
Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act, and it has rejected
subsequent attempts to broaden the scope of its original interpretation. For us to now hold that Title
VII protects transsexuals would take us out of the realm of interpreting and reviewing and into the
realm of legislating.
Id. at 1086 (citing Gunnison v Commr., 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1972)).
96. Id. at 1082-83.
97. Id. at 1083.
98. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
99. Id. at 1082.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1085.
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when adding "because of... sex" to Title VII. 1° 2 The court then held that Congress
"never considered nor intended" Title VII to mean more than its "plain language
implies." 10 3 Thus, the court held Title VII did not "apply to anything other than the
traditional concept of sex." 10 4 By giving this narrow interpretation, Title VII "would...
exclude transsexuals."
105
Ulane also tried to assert a claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of
being female. 10 6 However, the court held that a transsexual could not claim sex
discrimination on the basis of being female, if the discrimination that occurred stemmed
from her transsexual status. 10 7  Eastern Airlines discriminated against Ulane "not
because she is female, but because Ulane is a transsexual-a biological male who takes
female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to make it
appear to be female."
10 8
Around the same time of the Ulane decision, two other circuit courts also
addressed what "sex" meant in Title VII, in relation to transsexuals. 109 Both Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co.110 and Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.11 1 "held that
discrimination against transsexuals does not fall within the ambit of Title VII.' 1 12 In
Holloway, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals
because discrimination against transsexuals is based on "gender" not "sex." 113  The
plaintiff in Holloway, after telling her employer that she was going through treatment to
have a sex reassignment surgery, was told she "would be happier at a new job where her
transsexualism would be unknown," and was terminated.
1 14
In Sommers, 115 the Eighth Circuit held transsexuals are not protected by Title VII
because "the plain meaning must be ascribed to the term 'sex. ' 116 The plaintiff in
Sommers was "dismissed" from her job "because she misrepresented herself as an
anatomical female when she applied for the job.' ' 17 The plaintiff's misrepresentation
interfered with the "company's work routine" when some of the company's female
employees threatened to quit if the plaintiff would be allowed to use the women's
102. Id. at 1084.
103. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. "Had Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would have at
least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1086. See Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (discussing Ulane's narrow interpretation of "sex"
based on Congress's "intent," the Schroer court says, "[t]hose arguments, perhaps persuasive when written,
have lost their power after twenty years of changing jurisprudence on the nature and importance vel non of
legislative history").
106. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Holloway, 566 F.2d 659; Sommers, 667 F.2d 748.
110. 566 F.2d 659.
Ill. 667F.2d748.
112. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 (citing Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662-63; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750).
113. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-63).
114. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
115. 667 F.2d 748.
116. Id. at 750.
117. Id. at 748.
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restroom. 118
Until recently, all federal courts refused to extend Title VII's sex discrimination
protection to transsexuals. 1 19 But, a 1989 Supreme Court ruling, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 120 may have accidentally opened the door for transgender individuals by
broadening the interpretation of "sex" to include gender stereotyping. 12 1 The plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse was not a transsexual; she was an "aggressive" woman who was
passed over for a promotion because she was too "macho." 122 Thus, the Supreme Court
established that Title VII's "because of ... sex" language included discrimination based
on biological sex "and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to
conform to stereotypical gender norms."
123
In the wake of Price Waterhouse, some courts have rightly abandoned the Ulane
reasoning and have held that "Title VII protects transsexuals who do not conform to their
employers' gender stereotypes."'124 In 2004, the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem
said "the approach in Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane ... has been eviscerated by Price
Waterhouse."125 Smith reasoned that Price Waterhouse can apply to a transsexual
firefighter who was discriminated against when he was diagnosed with gender identity
disorder and started expressing more feminine characteristics. 126
The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk v. Hartford,127 by analogizing the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Price Waterhouse, held that transsexual individuals are
protected under the Gender Motivated Violence Act. 128 The Schwenk court said that
"under Price Waterhouse, 'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex-that is, the
biological differences between men and women-and gender." 129  The court
acknowledged "[t]he initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway [and
Ulane] has been overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse."' 130
Despite the Price Waterhouse decision, some courts continue to rely on Ulane's
reasoning to deny transsexuals' discrimination claims. 13 1 These courts refuse to apply
Price Waterhouse's sex stereotyping doctrine to transsexuals. 132  Instead, courts
118. Id at 748-49.
119. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 207; see Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Holloway,
566 F.2d at 662-63; Doe v. US. Postal Serv., 1985 WL 9446 at *2 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
120. 490 U.S. 228.
121. See id. at 250-51 (discussing that discrimination based on an employee's perceived failure to meet
certain sex stereotypes violated Title VII).
122. Id. at 234-35.
123. Smith, 378 F.3d at 573 (emphasis added) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
124. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 207. See also Smith, 378 F.3d at 573; Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401
F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005).
125. Smith, 378 F.3d at 573 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 572-73.
127. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
128. Id at 1201-02.
129. Id. at 1202.
130. Id. at 1201.
131. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 209; see e.g. Cox v. Denny's Inc., 1999 WL 1317785 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22,
1999); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 2002 WL 31098541 at **5- (E.D. La. 2001); Dobre v. Natl. R.R.
Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Etsitty 1, 2005 WL 1505610 at *6; Underwood, 857 F.
Supp. at 98.
132. Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-gender Behavior, 40 Har. Civ. Rights-
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continue to use "pre-Price Waterhouse cases that perpetuate gender inequality." 133 For
example, two federal district courts, post-Price Waterhouse, held a transsexual employee
could not bring a Title VII claim on the basis of sex discrimination. 134 In Dobre v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp.,135 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that Title VII did not protect transsexuals from discrimination on the
"basis of their transsexualism" and, accordingly, Title VII does not prohibit workplace
discrimination "against a male because he wants to become a female." 136 In Dobre, the
plaintiff began transitioning from male-to-female several months after being hired by the
defendant. 137 When she informed the supervisors about her hormone treatments she was
told she would still be required to wear male clothes. 138 Also, her supervisor continued
calling her by her male name, and her desk was moved from view of the public. 139 In
ruling that transsexuals were not protected by Title VII, the Dobre court relied solely on
Ulane and Holloway and made no reference to Price Waterhouse. 140 The court never
even acknowledged the existence of sex stereotyping in its decision.
14 1
Again, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah in Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Authority142 rejected the employment discrimination claims of a transsexual bus
driver. 143 In Etsitty, Senior Judge David Sam rejected the application of the Price
Waterhouse rationale to transsexual claims. 144 Judge David Sam stated "[t]he Sixth
Circuit, in two recent cases, has applied the Price Waterhouse rationale to transsexuals,
and has concluded that Ulane and its progeny are no longer good law[;]" 14 5 however,
"[t]his court disagrees.' 1
4 6
The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed the district court's decision in Etsitty. 147 In
regards to Etsitty's "because of ... sex" claim, the Tenth Circuit, following the Ulane
case, held discrimination against a transsexual is not discrimination "because of... sex"
within Title VII. 148 As to Etsitty's sex stereotyping claim, the court would not decide
whether such a claim is available to transsexuals, because Etsitty failed to show a
genuine issue of material fact as to her employer's motivation for her termination. 1
4 9
As the following section will show, Etsitty and other courts using Ulane's rationale
Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 277, 277 (2005).
133. Id. at283.
134. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. 284; Etsitty 1, 2005 WL 1505610.
135. 850 F. Supp. 284.
136. Id. at 286-87.
137. Id. at 285.
138. Id. at 286.
139. Id.
140. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 286-87.
141. Id. at 284-90.
142. 2005 WL 1505610.
143. Id. at *1, *7.
144. Id. at *4.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *5.
147. Etsitty II, 502 F.3d 1215 (holding that a transsexual could not state a Title VII "because of... sex"
claim).
148. Id. at 1221-22.
149. Id. at 1224 (the Tenth Circuit said "we assume, without deciding, that such a claim is available").
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are ignoring the fact that Title VII is not limited to those types of discrimination that
Congress intended. Further, the courts rejecting transsexuals' Title VII claims are
misinterpreting failed attempts to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation, as failed attempts to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based
on gender identity. Gender identity defines transsexuals, not sexual orientation.150
IV. TITLE VII Is NOT LIMITED TO BIOLOGICAL SEX
Courts reject transsexuals' sex discrimination claims based on a two prong
rationale. First, they contend that legislative history suggests that Congress did not
intend "because of... sex" to mean more than biological sex. 15 1 Thus, the "words [in
Title VII] should be given their ordinary, common meaning."] 52 Second, the courts note
that the failure of proposed amendments to Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation "indicates that Congress intended the phrase ["because of.. . sex"]...
to be narrowly interpreted."'15 3
Under the first prong, courts deny transsexuals protection under Title VII on the
basis that Congress intended the prohibition against sex discrimination to be narrowly
interpreted to mean biological sex. 154 The Ulane court stated Title VII should be given
its "plain meaning" and thus only "[prohibit] discrimination.., against women because
they are women and men because they are men." 155 However, this narrow interpretation
is inconsistent with Supreme Court rulings on reading remedial statutes. 156  The
Supreme Court, in discussing statutory construction has held that remedial statutes, like
Title VII, "should be construed broadly to effectuate [their] purposes.' 15 7 One district
court held that because Title VII is a remedial statute, courts "must seek in every case 'an
interpretation animated by the broad humanitarian and remedial purposes underlying the
federal proscription of employment discrimination." ' 158 Many current cases, however,
continue to apply Ulane's reasoning, which completely disregards that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed. 159 For example, the Etsitty court explicitly agrees with the
reasoning in Ulane, despite the fact that "Title VII is a remedial statute, which should be
150. Gender Identity Disorder "represents a profound disturbance of the individual's sense of identity with
regard to maleness or femaleness." Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (citing Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV 564 (Am. Psychiatric Assn. 1994)).
151. Ulane, 742 F.2dat 1085.
152. Id.
153. Etsittyl, 2005 WL 1505610 at *3; see Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4 n. 53 (listing proposed bills by
members of Congress to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation); Ulane, 742
F.2d at 1085 (noting that in statutory construction, "words should be given their ordinary, common meaning"
and that the "plain meaning" of the statute "implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because
they are women and against men because they are men").
154. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Underwood, 875 F. Supp. at 98.
155. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
156. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (discussing how remedial statutes "should be
construed broadly to effectuate [their] purposes").
157. Id. at 336.
158. Nordell v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 47, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 642
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (footnotes omitted)).
159. See e.g. Etsittv I, 2005 WL 1505610 at *3 (acknowledging Title VII as a remedial statute, but
nevertheless refusing to construe it liberally).
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liberally construed."
160
Rulings subsequent to the Ulane decision show the Supreme Court has "applied
Title VII in ways Congress could not have contemplated."' 16 1 The Supreme Court "has
repeatedly refused to limit Title VII to only those types of discrimination that Congress
presumably had in mind when enacting the law."'162 Justice Scalia, writing on whether
same-sex discrimination was intended by Congress when it enacted Title VII, said
male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed. 
163
The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that Congress intended Title VII to
apply only to women and not to men. 164 It has also rejected arguments that Title VII sex
discrimination applies only to "tangible, economic barriers" rather than "psychological
aspects." 165 And, as mentioned above, it has "rejected the argument that Title VII did
not prohibit same-sex sexual harassment.' 16 6  The Supreme Court rejected these
arguments despite the fact that these types of discrimination were not what "Title VII
was enacted to combat" 167 and despite the fact that "Congress had not specifically
indicated its intention to proscribe such conduct. ' 168 In rejecting the argument that Title
VII does not apply to psychological aspects but only economic barriers, the Supreme
Court stated "[Title VII] evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women in employment."
169
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse notes that it is "difficult ... to imagine"
that Congress intended "because of' to require plaintiffs' claims to be caused by
discrimination because of biological sex. 170  Rather, "Congress meant to obligate [a
plaintiff] to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to
its decision." 171 This interpretation is further supported "by the fact that Title VII does
160. Id. at *3. The court in Etsitty I said "our responsibility is to 'interpret this congressional legislation and
determine what Congress intended when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex."' Id. (citing Ulane,
742 F.2d at 1084).
161. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
162. Pl.'s Memo. in Opposition to Def's Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10, Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 203; see Cotton,
supra n. 55, at 1049-51 (discussing examples of Supreme Court rulings that have extended the coverage of
"because of... sex" in Title VII).
163. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79
(1998)) (Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in Oncale).
164. Pl.'s Memo. in Opposition to Def's Mot. to Dismiss at 10, Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 203; see e.g.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679-81 (1983).
165. Pl.'s Memo. in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 10, Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 203 (quoting
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64 (1986)).
166. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
167. Id; see e.g. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679-81.
168. Pl.'s Memo. in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 10, Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 203 (citing Oncale,
523 U.S. at 79).
169. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n. 13 (1978)).
170. 490U.S.at241.
171. Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
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identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into account."' 172 The
Court states "[t]he only plausible inference to draw from this provision" is that gender
cannot be a consideration in an employment decision.173
Ulane and its progeny suggest because the main purpose of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was to end race discrimination, 174 sex, like race, should be treated as an immutable
characteristic. 175  Also, Title VII is not limited to prohibit only immutable
characteristics. For example, Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on religion, a
voluntary characteristic. 176 In addition, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
other voluntary conduct, like "bearing or adoption of children." 17 7 Assuming Title VII
is limited to immutable characteristics is not only untrue, but is an "oversimplified
approach."
178
Second, courts denying transsexuals' claims also rely on the failed attempts to
broaden Title VII to cover sexual orientation. 179 While it is true that the attempts to add
sexual orientation into Title VII have failed, "it appears that no bill has ever been
introduced in Congress to include or exclude discrimination based on sexual identity." 180
Thus, "the failure of numerous attempts to broaden Title VII to cover sexual orientation
says nothing about Title VII's relationship to sexual identity."' 181 One district court
observed in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, that "it appears that no bill has ever been
introduced in Congress to include or exclude" transsexuals. 182  As Judge Robertson
notes in Schroer v. Billington,183 "[t]he silence [on sexual identity over the last] forty
years is simply that-silence."
184
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse makes it clear that "because
of... sex" in Title VII encompasses more than the narrow meaning of "sex." 185 The
Court said, "because of... sex" means "that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions,"' 186 and "in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because
172. Id. at 242 (stating that an employer may take gender into account when "gender is a 'bona fide
occupational qualification ... reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or
enterprise."'). Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)).
173. Id.
174. Cotton, supra n. 55, at 1046.
175. Id. at 1059 n. 176 ("'[W]hen Congress used the word 'sex' in Title VII it was referring to a person's




179. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-86 (noting that several attempts "to amend Title VII to prohibit
discrimination based upon... 'sexual orientation"' have all failed); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (attempts to add
"sexual preference" to Title VII have failed); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 (Title VII should be given a narrow
interpretation, as shown by the failed attempts to add "sexual preference" to Title VII).
180. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (citing Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4) (emphasis removed).
181. Id. (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Il1. 1983)).
182. Id. (citing Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4).
183. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.
184. Id. at 212.
185. 490 U.S. at 239 ("Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making
employment decisions appears on the face of the statute."). "[I]n forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes." Id. at 251.
186. Id. at 240.
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of their sex, Congress intended to strike the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from gender stereotypes."'187 Price Waterhouse states that
"Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment
11188decisions appears on the face of the statute. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring
opinion, said "the explicit consideration of... sex ... in making employment decisions
'was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII."' 189 Judge
Robertson points out that while the arguments to reject transsexuals' claims are "perhaps
persuasive when written, [they] have lost their power after twenty years of changing
jurisprudence on the nature and importance vel non [1901 of legislative history."
19 1
V. SEX STEREOTYPING: BROADENING THE MEANING OF SEX
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins192 seemed to have
unintentionally opened the door for transgender individuals claiming sex discrimination
on the basis of sex stereotyping. In Price Waterhouse, the Court departed from the view
that Title VII's "because of ... sex" only protects discrimination on the basis of
biological sex. 193 Rather, Price Waterhouse explicitly extends "[because of ... sex] to
mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions."'
194
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff Ann Hopkins was a senior manager of a
professional accounting firm, Price Waterhouse. 195  "Hopkins had worked at Price
Waterhouse[ ]... for five years when the partners... proposed her as a candidate for
partnership [in the firm]." 19 6  Although Hopkins was described by partners as an
"'outstanding professional"' with a "'strong character, independence and integrity,"' she
was denied partnership. 19 7 The Court cites evidence which shows that Price Waterhouse
denied her partnership because Hopkins failed to conform to the partners' idea of what
the "proper behavior of women" should be. 19 8 The partners said that Hopkins was too
"'macho,"' that she "'overcompensated for being a woman,"' and that she
inappropriately used foul language. 199 Hopkins was told that in order to "improve her
chances for partnership,. . . [she] should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.'
200
Because gender cannot be a factor in employment decisions, the Supreme Court
187. Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 239.
189. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (citing Id. at 275 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted)).
190. Vel non means "[o]r the absence of it." Black's Law Dictionary 1589 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed.,
West 2004).
191. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (emphasis in original).
192. 490 U.S. 228.
193. Id. at239-40.
194. Id. at 240.
195. Id. at 232-33.
196. Id. at233.
197. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
198. Id. at 235-37.
199. Id. at 235 (noting that a partner advised Hopkins she should not swear because "it's a lady using foul
language").
200. Id. (citation omitted).
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held that "an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."2° 1 This type of
discrimination is "sex stereotyping" which the Court states is protected by Title VII.
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "[iun forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes."
2 02
The Supreme Court lays out a test for discrimination on the basis of sex
stereotyping in Price Waterhouse.203 Under the Court's test, a plaintiff must first show
that "gender played a motivating part in an employment decision."2° 4 The Court notes
that "stereotyped remarks can ... be evidence that gender played a part." 2° 5  In
Hopkins's case, the stereotyping went beyond just "stray remarks. ' 2 ° 6 Price Waterhouse
had actually assessed "comments stemm[ing] from sex stereotypes" to make the decision
about Hopkins's partnership.
20 7
Once the plaintiff proves gender was a consideration in an employers' employment
decision, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove "by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
plaintiffs gender into account." 2° 8 The Supreme Court did not rule on whether Price
Waterhouse would have made the same decision without taking Hopkins's gender into
account, because the trial and appellate courts incorrectly held "the defendant must make
this proof by clear and convincing evidence." 20 9
According to Price Waterhouse, sex stereotyping a "feminine" acting man who is
ridiculed, mocked, and assaulted because he is not "masculine" enough, is actionable sex
discrimination.2 1° However, courts still draw a line between cases involving "disparate
treatment" based on stereotypical assumptions as to masculinity or femininity, which is
protected, and claims involving discrimination based on sexual orientation, which is
not.211 This distinction is important since the Price Waterhouse logic does not extend to
all cases of sex stereotyping, because "[s]ex stereotyping that does not produce disparate
201. Id. at 240, 250.
202. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
203. Id. at 244-45.
204. Id. at 244.
205. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original).
206. Id.
207. 490 U.S. at 251.
208. Id. at 258 (A plaintiff must prove "gender played a motivating part in an employment decision.").
209. Id.
210. See e.g. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 568, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001
(1998) (plaintiffs' sex was questioned, ridiculed for wearing an earring, and threatened with sexual assault);
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (court applied the Price Waterhouse
rationale to a case where a male plaintiff was criticized for carrying his tray "like a woman").
211. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff failed to
state a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII when the harassment stemmed from perceptions of his
sexual orientation); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 2000) (court rejected
plaintiffs claim of sex stereotyping because the discrimination was based on his sexual orientation, and thus,
was not because of sex).
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treatment does not violate Title VII." 2 12 In cases involving discrimination based on
sexual orientation, the discrimination is "gender-neutral: it impacts homosexual men and
women alike" and thus is not "because of ... sex." 2 13 Also, "gender-specific dress...
codes" are not protected by sex stereotyping as long as they "do not disparately impact
one sex or impose an unequal burden." 2 14 The judge in Schroer suggests this type of
logic, which bars claims based on sexual orientation, could also bar transsexual cases.
2 15
Further, courts draw a line between cases where the discrimination was based on a
person's gender identity not matching their biological sex,216 and cases where the
discrimination was based on a person's failure to conform to sex stereotypes. 2 17 This is
a critical distinction, because the majority of courts hold that the first situation is not
protected by Title VII, while the latter is.
Following the Price Waterhouse decision, Title VII prohibits "sex stereotyping" by
"creat[ing] space for people of both sexes to express their sexual identity in
nonconforming ways.'218 In other words, employers cannot discriminate on the basis
that a man is acting too "feminine" or on the basis that a woman is acting too
"macho." 2 19  Male and female employees can "express their individual . .. identities
without reprisal for being perceived" as not conforming to stereotypical sex-role
behavior.
220
In Smith v. City of Salem,2 2 1 the Sixth Circuit applied the Price Waterhouse
rationale to a case involving a transsexual plaintiff.222 Smith, the plaintiff, was a male-
to-female transsexual who suffered from GID.223  For seven years, Smith was a
lieutenant with the fire department and never had any "negative incidents." 224 However,
when Smith revealed his GID to the department and began to express a feminine look, he
was treated differently from other males in the department, because "his appearance and
mannerisms were not masculine enough." 225 City officials even conspired to have Smith
fired, which prompted Smith to threaten suit.226  Within the week, the fire chief
suspended Smith for an "alleged infraction of... policy.' 2 27  Smith then filed a
212. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
213. Id.; see Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751-52 (4th
Cir. 1996); Schroeder v. Hamilton School Dist., 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
214. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 208-09; see e.g. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d
1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
215. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
216. See generally Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.
217. See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
218. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
219. See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231-35.
220. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
221. 378 F.3d 566.
222. ld at 567, 571.
223. Id. at 568.
224. Id.
225. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
226. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568-69.
227. Id at 569.
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complaint against the city alleging sex stereotyping pursuant to Price Waterhouse.
228
Smith argued, "he would not have been treated differently, on account of his non-
masculine behavior and GID, had he been a woman instead of a man.' 229 The district
court dismissed the claim on grounds that Smith failed to state a claim for sex
stereotyping. 230 The district court reasoned that Smith's sex stereotyping claim was an
"end run around his real claim, which ... was based upon his transsexuality." 2 3 1 The
Sixth Circuit, however, disagreed and reversed the district court's decision, finding
Smith had a valid sex stereotyping claim under Title VII.232 The court first addressed
the requirements to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, stating that
a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) the
defendant knew he engaged in this protected activity; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an
employment action adverse to him; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.
233
The court easily found that Smith engaged in a protected activity, that the
defendant knew it was protected, and that there was a causal connection.2 34 As to the
third element, the court went into a careful examination on whether the fire department's
235actions were adverse to Smith. The court found that when the fire department
suspended Smith, the suspension constituted an adverse employment action.
2 36
The Smith court then went on to see if Smith, as a transsexual, could properly
allege a sex stereotyping claim under Price Waterhouse.237 The court held that because
Smith had "alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man
should look and behave was the driving force behind [the fire department's] actions,"
Smith had successfully stated a sex stereotyping claim. 238 The court reasoned, "an
employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear
dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would
not occur but for the victim's sex.' 239 Thus, "[an employer] who discriminate[s] against
men because they do wear dresses ... are also engaging in sex discrimination, because
the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex.
' 24 0
The "sweeping language" of Smith suggests that "in the eyes of at least one federal
circuit, discrimination against transsexuals and discrimination 'because of... sex' are
indistinguishable. ' ' 24 1 The Smith court makes clear that Price Waterhouse "does not
make Title VII protection against sex stereotyping conditional or ... exclude Title VII
228. Id. at 569, 571.
229. Id. at 570.
230. Id. at 571.
231. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 575.
233. Id. at 570.
234. Id. at 570-71.
235. Id. at571, 575-76.
236. Smith, 378 F.3d at 576.
237. Id. at 571-75.
238. Id. at 572.
239. Id. at 574.
240. Id. (emphasis in original).
241. Dishman, supra n. 71, at 133.
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coverage for non sex-stereotypical behavior simply because the person is a
transsexual."
242
A year after the Smith decision, the Sixth Circuit echoed the Smith holding in
another employment discrimination case involving a transsexual plaintiff.243 In Barnes
v. City of Cincinnati,244 the plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual, "established that he
was a member of a protected class by alleging discrimination against the City for his
failure to conform to sex stereotypes. "2 45  And again on May 31, 2006, in Myers v.
Cuyahoga County,246 the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that Title VII protects transsexuals
from sex stereotyping. 247 The Myers court plainly stated "Title VII protects transsexual
persons from discrimination for failing to act in accordance and/or identify with their
perceived sex or gender."
248
While the Sixth Circuit is the only federal appellate court to specifically address
whether transsexuals are protected under Title VII, district courts in the Second and
Fourth Circuits have also addressed the issue. 249 Both district courts "held or implied
that Title VII extends protections to transsexuals." 250  In Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet
Lakeshore Hospital,25 1 a New York district court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim in violation of Title VII, holding that a transsexual
could successfully allege a claim under Title VII.
252
The plaintiff, Tronetti, was a male-to-female transsexual that was discriminated
against by TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hospital (TLC), where she worked as a clinical
psychiatrist and doctor of osteopathy. 253 One member of the board at TLC had spread
rumors about Tronetti to outpatients and had openly questioned her sanity. 254 Another
TLC employee, Luisa Kelsey, the nurse manager, spread rumors about Tronetti's
"sexuality and medical condition., 2 55 TLC's vice president for mental health even told
Tronetti that she should "avoid wearing overtly feminine attire. ' 256 Overall, TLC's staff
created a hostile work environment for Tronetti. 257 Tronetti brought an employment
242. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574-75.
243. Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737 (following the Smith holding, establishing that the plaintiff in Barnes stated a
claim under sex stereotyping).
244. 401 F.3d 729.
245. Id. at 737.
246. 182 Fed. Appx. 510 (6th Cir. 2006).
247. Id. at 519.
248. Id. (citing Barnes, 401 F.3d 729; Smith, 378 F.3d 566).
249. See Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., 2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003); see
also Lewis v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638 (D. Md. 2002).
250. Geier et al., supra n. 35 (citing Tronetti, 2003 WL 22757935 at *4) (Title VII claim actionable when a
transsexual alleges discrimination for failing to act like a man); Lewis, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 646 n. 3. ("those of
'transgender' would appear to belong to a protected group as well").
251. Tronetti, 2003 WL 22757935.
252. Id. at *1, *5. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied in part and granted in part. The court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss on the plaintiff's Title VII claim; however, the court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss because the plaintiff "fail[ed] to state a claim for violation of the FMLA." Id. at *5.
253. Id. at*l.
254. Id. at **2-3.
255. Tronetti, 2003 WL 22757935 at *2.
256. Id. at*l.
257. Id. at *2.
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discrimination claim under Title VII against TLC "claiming to have been discriminated
against for failing to act like a man."
258
The Tronetti court looked at the Ulane case and flatly rejected its holding.2 59 The
court explicitly stated "[tihis Court is not bound by the Ulane decisions" and that "this
Court will not follow Ulane.' 260  The court went on to say that Price Waterhouse
"undermined the reasoning of the Ulane decisions." 26 1 Accordingly, the court held
"[t]ranssexuals are not gender-less, they are either male or female and are thus protected
under Title VII to the extent that they are discriminated against on the basis of sex."
2 62
Other circuit courts have also applied the Price Waterhouse logic to transsexual
plaintiffs' claims under other federal laws.26 3  These courts state that Ulane and




"[This] suggest[s] that the [First] and [Ninth] Circuits may be receptive to Title VII
claims by transsexuals post-Price Waterhouse."
265
Likewise, the Price Waterhouse rationale applies to a man who is being
discriminated against for being too feminine. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises, Inc.,266 a man brought a successful "Price Waterhouse-type claim" 267 when
he was harassed based on the employer's stereotypical perceptions that the plaintiff was
too feminine. 268 In Nichols, the plaintiff was harassed "for walking and carrying his
serving tray like a woman."
269
Under this Price Waterhouse-type approach, a male-to-female transsexual would
be protected by Title VII if the employer perceived the employee as a man with feminine
traits who does not conform to gender stereotypes. 27  However, this approach does not
protect against discrimination when a male-to-female transsexual is being discriminated
against for going "against the gender grain" but because her gender identity does not
match her biological sex. 27 1  This critical distinction will be discussed in the next
section.
258. Id. at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
259. Id.
260. Tronetti, 2003 WL 22757935 at *4.
261. Id. at *4.
262. Id.
263. Geier, supra n. 35 (citing Schwenk, 204 F.3d 1187; Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213
(1st Cir. 2000)).
264. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201.
265. Geier, supra n. 35.
266. 256 F.3d 864.
267. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
268. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874; see Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. at 208 (noting that "harassment 'based upon the
perception that [the plaintiff] is effeminate' is discrimination because of sex").
269. 256 F.3d at 870. "The [plaintiff] testified that other Azteca employees habitually called him sexually
derogatory names, referred to him with the female gender, and taunted him for behaving like a woman." Id. at
872.
270. See Smith, 378 F.3d 566; United Consumer Fin. Servs., 2001 WL 34350174 at *5 (acknowledging a
distinction between a transsexual's claim of sex discrimination when her "appearance and behavior did not fit
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VI. GENDER IDENTITY: A NEW APPROACH TO SEX DISCRIMINATION
Based on the above analysis, transsexual plaintiffs who experience discrimination
that stems from their failure to conform to "sex stereotypes," are (or should be) protected
by Title VII. But what is unclear is whether transsexuals, who are conforming to sex
stereotypes but are still being discriminated against because they are transsexual, are
protected. The District of Columbia District Court addressed this exact issue in Schroer
v. Billington.
272
In 2004, the Library of Congress seemed to have found the perfect candidate for a
terrorism research analyst. 2 73 Diane Schroer, a recently retired Airborne Ranger and
qualified Army Special Forces officer, had completed over 450 parachute jumps and had
held a variety of command and staff positions in the Army, including those in Armored
Cavalry, Special Forces, and Special Operations units, and in operations in Panama,
Haiti, and Rwanda. 274  Schroer had received numerous awards and decorations,
including the Defense Superior Service Medal. 275 Schroer also had earned master's
degrees in history and international relations, and had helped brief top officials in
Washington, including Dick Cheney.276 Schroer specialized in counter-insurgency and
counter-terrorism. 2 77 "After 25 years of distinguished service" in the Army, Schroer
retired as a Colonel.
278
Thus, "[w]hen she interviewed for a job as a terrorism research analyst at the
Library of Congress, [Schroer] thought she'd found the perfect fit.'279 After Schroer
interviewed with Charlotte Preece, a member of the Congressional Research Service,
Preece told Schroer that she had been selected for the position and salary negotiations
were made. 28  Preece told Schroer that the "selection committee believed that Schroer's
skills and experience made her application far superior to those of the other
candidates."
28 1
Prior to starting work, Schroer explained to Preece that she was in the process of
gender transitioning.282 At the time of her birth, Schroer's sex was classified as male
and her parents had given her the name of David.283 Schroer recognized that "[u]p to
this point, [she] had been using her traditionally masculine legal name, and she had
interacted with Preece while wearing traditionally masculine clothing."2 84 Schroer, as
part of her medical treatment for GID, was about to change her name to Diane and to
272. Id.
273. Id. at 205-06.
274. Id. at 205; see ACLU, ACLU Files Lawsuit on Behalf of Army Veteran against Library of Congress for
Transgender Discrimination, http://www.aclu.org/Igbt/transgender/12256prs20050602.html (June 2, 2005).
275. ACLU, supra n. 274.
276. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06.
277. Id.
278. ACLU, supra n. 274.
279. ACLU, Schroer v. Library of Congress: Case Profile, http://www.aclu.org/igbt/transgender/
24969res20050602.html (June 2, 2005).
280. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 205.
284. Id. at 206.
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begin presenting herself in traditionally feminine clothes.
2 85
During the conversation with Preece, Schroer presented photographs of herself in
feminine clothes "[t]o reassure Preece that she would dress in a workplace-appropriate
manner."2 86 Schroer, commenting on why she showed the pictures to Preece, stated that
"[n]o one wants to go through life being the punch line of a joke.... I wanted her to see
I looked good, professional. 287 At the end of the conversation, Preece told Schroer she
had "'really given [her] something to think about."' 2 88 The next day, Preece called and
rescinded Schroer's job offer.2 8 9 Preece explained that after a "long, restless night she
had decided that given [Schroer's] circumstances and for the good of the service, Schroer
would not be a good fit at [the Library of Congress]." 290
Schroer's "first instinct was to just let it go." 29 1 However, after thinking about
what happened, "she felt the sting of injustice. ' 292 "After risking my life for more than
25 years for my country, I've been told I'm not worthy of the freedoms I worked so hard
to protect," said Schroer.293 Schroer then filed suit against the Library of Congress for
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
2 94
In Schroer v. Billington, Schroer was "not seeking acceptance as a man with
feminine traits," rather, Schroer wanted acceptance to express her identity as a female,
not a feminine male. 295 Schroer did "not wish to go against the gender grain, but with
it. ' ' 296  She did all the things normally associated with female stereotypes, including
going by the name "Diane" and wearing feminine clothes. 297  The court in Schroer
acknowledged a significant distinction between Schroer's discrimination claim and the
plaintiffs claim in Price Waterhouse.
298
In this case, the Library of Congress had a problem with Schroer's gender identity
as a woman not matching her biological sex as a man, and not because she failed to
conform to gender stereotypes. 299 Thus, Schroer could not successfully plead a claim
285. Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
286. Id.
287. Petula Dvorak, The Right Person for the Job: Library of Congress Accused of Withdrawing Job Offer
after Applicant Reveals Gender Change, Washington Post B9 (June 2, 2005) (available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontent/article/2005/06/01/AR2005060101777.html).
288. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
289. Id.
290. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
291. Mark Brown, Should Gender Matter When You Want to Serve? Chi. Sun Times (June 2, 2005).
292. Id.
293. ACLU, supra n. 274.
294. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
295. Id. at 210-11. "She seeks to express her female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a woman."
Id. at 211. Later in 2007, Schroer amended her complaint to add a sex stereotyping claim. Judge Robertson
again denied the Library of Congress' Motion to dismiss saying Schroer had successfully stated an
"impermissible sex stereotyping [claim] pursuant to Title VI." Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62
(D.D.C. 2007) [hereinafter Schroer 11].
296. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
297. Id. at 211.
298. Id. at 210
299. Id. at 210-11; see e.g. Smith, 378 F.3d 566 (holding that a transsexual plaintiff, born a biological male,
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for sex stereotyping. 300 The logic and reasoning in Price Waterhouse and Smith "does
not extend to situations where the dress and makeup are intended to express, and are
understood by the employer to be expressing, a female identity." 30 1 Thus, that logic
does not cover situations when an actual or potential employee is attempting to conform
to a certain gender. The Price Waterhouse type rationale only applies to situations where
a transsexual is experiencing discrimination based on the failure to conform to the
employer's expectations of how stereotypical men and woman act.
30 2
However, Schroer says that even though there is no claim for sex stereotyping, it
does not mean Schroer "has no protection under Title VII from discrimination based on
her transsexuality." 30 3 Judge Robertson says that transsexuals who are not hired "solely
because of [their] sexual identity," coupled with a scientific record on GID, could prove
they were discriminated against "because of ... sex." 304 Accordingly, the Schroer court
indicates that Title VII may prohibit discrimination against transgender people as a form
of sex discrimination. Robertson notes this is "a straightforward way to deal with the
factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity."
30 5
Schroer looked back to the district court's decision in Ulane and acknowledged the
possibility that sex may be more than just a "cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes." 30 6
Judge Robertson suggested, "it may be time to revisit" the idea that "discrimination
against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is 'literally' discrimination 'because
of... sex.' '307 Further, if you apply Title VII "straightforwardly" to transsexuality you
are "preserv[ing] the outcomes of the post-Price Waterhouse case law without colliding
with the sexual orientation and grooming code lines of cases." 30 8 The court found when
"discrimination stems from intolerance towards a person whose gender identity and
anatomical sex do not match (a bias distinct from sexual orientation discrimination), such
discrimination against transsexuals is literally discrimination because of sex." 3 0 9  In
300. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211. Schroer later amended her complaint to add a sex stereotyping claim
under Title VII. Schroer 11, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
301. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
302. Id. ("A transsexual plaintiff might successfully state a Price Waterhouse-type claim if the claim is that
he or she has been discriminated against because of a failure to act or appear masculine or feminine enough for
an employer.").
303. Id.; but see Schroer 11, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (discussing whether "sex" in Title VII is "'literally'
discrimination 'because of... sex'). "[T]hat taxonomy. .. [in the Schroer decision] has the same inherent
irony as the Sixth Circuit's decision in Smith ... and quite consciously implies that 'sex' for Title VII purposes
be given an expansive and nontraditional judicial gloss, which is precisely what the settled case law had
previously rejected." Michael Starr & Amy L. Strauss, Sex Stereotyping in Employment: Can the Center Hold?
21 Lab. Law. 213, 238 n. 129 (2006).
304. Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 213. "It should also be noted that the term 'sexual identity' is an older
term not in favor among many transgender advocates because it alludes to an anatomical/biological view of
identity. The preferred term... is 'gender identity,' which implies that psychological gender has no relation to
anatomical sex." Jillian Todd Weiss, Workplace Prof Blog, Transsexual Can Sue for Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/04/transexual can .html (Apr. 2,
2006).
305. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
306. Id. at 211 (citing Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825).
307. Id. at 212 (emphasis in original).
308. Id at 213.
309. Debra L. Raskin & Christopher P. Reynolds, Year in Review: Supreme Court Decisions; Sex
Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Decisions; and Major Regulatory Initiatives, 745 PLI/Lit. 129, 153-54
(2006) (citing Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203).
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denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court said while Schroer did not state a
claim based on sex stereotyping, Schroer could prove she was discriminated against as a
transsexual in violation of Title VII. 3 10 The court ordered further discovery to see if the
term "sex" may scientifically apply to transsexuals.
3 11
On April 14, 2006, the Library of Congress filed its answer, one of its defenses
being that Schroer "failed to fulfill the national security requirements of the Specialist in
Terrorism and International Crime... position."3 12  The Library of Congress then
amended its answer on October 23, 2006, dropping that defense.3 13  The Schroer
outcome will be a landmark decision. As Paul M. Secunda, an assistant professor of law
at the University of Mississippi School of Law suggests, the Schroer case "has the
potential to prove ground-breaking on the issue of transexuality [sic] under Title VII." 3 14
Another legal scholar, Jillian Todd Weiss, says the Schroer case "may lead to a split
between courts that view transgender status as a matter of surgery, and those that view it
as a matter of self-determination of gender." 3 15 Attorney Dana Stripling says, "[t]he
[Schroer] case will surely land before the United States Supreme Court if the
government appeals."
3 16
Recent cases, like Smith and Schroer, suggest that a new trend is emerging
amongst federal courts. 317 These positive court decisions are correctly holding that Title
VII's "because of... sex" extends coverage to transsexuals who are being discriminated
against based on sex stereotyping and/or gender identity. 3 18 The Smith decision shows
Price Waterhouse can afford transsexuals protection under Title VII for sex stereotyping
discrimination. 3 19  Under Smith, a transsexual could successfully state a Price
Waterhouse-type claim for sex stereotyping, when the discrimination occurs on the basis
of the employee failing to conform to the employer's notions of what a man or woman
should act and look like.
320
As Judge Robertson makes clear in Schroer, a transsexual experiencing
discrimination based on their transsexuality, not the failure to conform to sex
stereotypes, is not protected by Price Waterhouse.321 However, this is not to say that
Title VII does not still protect transsexuals. 322 As Schroer points out, sex may not be a
"cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes." 323 Rather, sex may include a person's gender
310. Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 213.
311. Id.
312. Def.'s Ans. at 1, Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.
313. See Def.'s First Amend. Ans., Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.
314. Paul M. Secunda, Workplace Prof Blog, Transsexual Can Sue for Sex Discrimination under Title VII,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/04/transexual can .html (Apr. 2, 2006).
315. Weiss, supra n. 304.
316. Dana Stripling, Garlo Ward, P.C., The Meaning of "Sex", http://garloward.com/category/employment-
issues/page/2/ (Apr. 10, 2006).
317. See Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203; Smith, 378 F.3d 566; see also Tronetti, 2003 WL 22757935.
318. See generally Schroer 1, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203; Smith, 378 F.3d 566.
319. See Smith, 378 F.3d 571-76.
320. See id at 571-72 (male-to-female fire fighter successfully stated a Price Waterhouse-type claim when
discrimination occurred based on his non-masculine behavior).
321. SeeSchroer1,424F.Supp.2dat2l1.
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing Ulane, 581 F.Supp. at 825).
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identity as well. 3 24 Schroer correctly suggests that a transsexual being discriminated
against on the basis of their transsexuality is discrimination "because of. .. sex," and
thus transsexuals can be protected by Title VII.
325
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts are beginning to abandon the view that transsexuals are an oddity; instead,
courts are acknowledging that transsexuals are a legitimate minority and are entitled to
protection under the law. "It is a basic American value" that people should be judged on
the work they perform, not on their "personal characteristics." 326 Transsexuals should
be judged no differently. Transsexuals are not seeking special protection; they are
seeking equal protection under the law.
[T]ransgendered people want to lead normal lives and to be employed. They do not want
to live in poverty, [or] on unemployment or general assistance ... in an attempt to survive.
They want to live their lives quietly, without fear of discrimination, harassment and
violence, just like all other citizens of this country. 327
Courts like Smith and Schroer are acknowledging that transsexuals are not
genderless, and that sex may encompass more than the state of one's physical body at
birth. By acknowledging that "sex" is more than "a cut-and-dried matter of
chromosomes, ' 32 8 courts are correctly abandoning Ulane, which at one time was
synonymous with the idea that being transsexual would automatically invalidate a Title
VII claim of employment discrimination.
These courts are correctly interpreting "because of ... sex" within Title VII. First,
courts are recognizing that Title VII, as a remedial statute, should be read broadly to
accomplish its purpose. Second, these courts are recognizing the lack of legislative
history on Title VII's "because of... sex" does not limit the statute to what Congress
might have had in mind when enacting the law. This recognition is shown by the
Supreme Court broadening Title VII to prohibit same-sex harassment, male
discrimination, and gender discrimination. Third, courts are acknowledging that the
failed attempts to add sexual orientation to Title VII does not amount to failed attempts
to add transsexuals to Title VII. Transsexualism is about being a man or a woman, not
about being attracted to a man or a woman--a significant distinction. Finally, courts are
holding that discrimination on the basis of "sex stereotyping" and/or "gender identity" is
protected by Title VII.
While the legal status of transsexual employment discrimination seems unsure and
complicated, the cases discussed in this paper prove to be successful advances for
transsexual protection from employment discrimination. It seems that both
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes and discrimination on the basis of gender
324. Id. (Schroer uses "sexual identity" instead of "gender identity," but both mean "a question of self-
perception.").
325. Id. at212-13.
326. Jost, supra n. 10, at 391 (quoting Lisa Mottet, a transgender-rights lawyer with the Task Force).
327. Intl. Conf. Transgender L. & Empl. Policy, Discrimination against Transgendered People in America, 3
Nail. J. Sexual Orientation L. 1, 3 (1997).
328. Schroerl, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
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identity should be protected by Title VII's "because of... sex." Ultimately, explicit
protection of transsexuals is needed to make certain employers and the public understand
that transsexual discrimination is prohibited. As the United States Supreme Court has
pointed out: "Enumeration is the essential device used to make the duty not to
discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those who must comply." 329
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329. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996).
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